OLL 83-1979/3 22 November 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Personnel

FROM:

Liaison Division

Office of Legislative Liaison

SUBJECT:

Congressional Hearing on the Senior Executive

Service (SES)

REFERENCE:

OLL 83-1979/2, dated 7 November 1983, Same

Subject

- 1. Attached for your information and use is the full statement of the Comptroller General, together with 28 appendices of statistical data that resulted from the study that was commissioned at the request of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. The referenced memorandum provided you with Mr. Bowsher's summary hearing statement only.
- 2. Just a quick perusal of the statistical information attached brings some interesting questions to mind. For example, Appendix IV, entitled "SES Members in Each Pay Rate" indicates that nearly 67% of the SES population occupy SES-4 through SES-6 positions, while only 17% of the total SES population (of nearly 6,900 in early 1983) occupy SES-1 and SES-2 positions. I haven't seen our SIS data recently but, as I recall, this SES distribution is significantly different from our SIS distribution. Is there a good reason for this? None comes to my mind immediately.
- 3. I suspect that a thorough review of the attached may yield some interesting conclusions which, when compared to our SIS experience, may result in a series of questions about our implementation of a senior service.
- 4. Please advise if I can be of help (further or otherwise).

Attachment: As stated

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## UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY EXPECTED AT 10:00 a.m. November 7, 1983

DETAILED STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD BY CHARLES A. BOWSHER COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

#### BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL SERVICE HOUSE POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE COMMITTEE

ON

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE

Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work in response to your request for an overall assessment of the Senior Executive Service (SES). SES, established by the Civil Service Reform Act, has often been called the cornerstone of civil service reform. The act provided for major changes in the management of the government's executive corps designed to achieve improvements in the efficiency, effectiveness, and responsiveness of government operations.

My testimony provides our general observations on SES and highlights some areas that warrant your attention.

We focused our work on four areas (see app. I) in which the act established major goals for SES:

- --Executives should be held accountable for government operations, and decisions related to their compensation, retention, and tenure should be based on their performance.
- --Agencies need greater flexibility in using their executive resources.
- --Executives should be protected from improper political influence.
- -- Executives' managerial capabilities should be improved.

Our work indicates progress is being made toward achieving the act's goals in these areas. Further progress depends largely on how well the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and agencies implement the act. We believe there are some areas where improvements can be made.

#### SES PROFILE

A brief look at how the SES corps has changed since it was established in July 1979 should provide some perspective for our observations. In July 1979, when SES came into being, there were 8,389 slots allocated to agencies, 7,677 SES positions established, and 6,948 positions filled. As of March 31, 1983, there were slight decreases in the number of slots allocated and positions filled—8,211 and 6,873 respectively—while the number of positions established has increased slightly to 7,861.

while these numbers indicate that SES has been rather static since its inception, a closer look reveals considerable change. Overall, almost 3,500 career and noncareer SES members

have left SES and government service since SES was established in July 1979 and an additional 200 have retreated to GS-15 positions. More than 40 percent of the career executives who converted to SES in July 1979 have left--roughly 2,500 of the 3,500 departures. Although we could not identify where all new SES members came from since the inception of SES, we did find that in fiscal year 1983, about 92 percent of the new career SES members came from within the federal government. (See app. II through VII.)

# EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR PROGRAM OPERATIONS

The Civil Service Reform Act emphasized that the accountability of senior executives was to be fixed and that individual performance was to be linked to organizational performance. To provide the basis for evaluating executive success, the act required that agencies establish executive performance appraisal systems. These systems were to establish performance requirements for each senior executive as the basis for annually appraising accomplishments. Appraisals were to be used in making personnel decisions relating to compensation, rewards, removal, transfers, reassignment, and training.

We found that agencies have implemented performance appraisal systems. Agencies have used the appraisal systems primarily to assess individual performance, not to explicitly relate individual to organizational performance. During our review of SES performance appraisal systems, officials at 7 of

the 10 agencies we reviewed told us they do not emphasize linking individual and organizational performance because (1) performance measurement data are lacking and (2) it is difficult to identify individual contributions to the accomplishment of organizational objectives.

Our review of 1,100 randomly selected performance plans showed that a majority of the plans (1) did not address the act's appraisal criteria for focusing attention on organizational performance improvement goals, (2) lacked specific statements of expected performance, and (3) were prepared after the beginning of the appraisal cycle and were not updated or revised when executives' responsibilities changed. In addition, plans were not prepared by a majority of noncareerists. limitations in performance planning inhibit the effectiveness of SES appraisal systems as tools for managing and improving individual and organizational performance. Although 71 to 88 percent of senior executives we surveyed generally gave positive responses about their own performance plans and appraisals, over half of the executives believed their agency's SES performance appraisal system (1) had minimal effect on performance, (2) had not improved communication between superiors and subordinates, and (3) was not worth its cost.

## Bonus and award systems

To encourage excellence in senior executives' performance the act provided that career senior executives with fully successful performance ratings could receive lump-sum bonuses of up

to 20 percent of their basic salary. The act limited the number of bonuses that could be awarded to 50 percent of the total slots allocated to agencies. In addition, a career executive could receive the rank of meritorious executive for sustained accomplishments or could receive the rank of distinguished executive for sustained extraordinary accomplishments. These executive ranks carry one-time payments of \$10,000 and \$20,000, respectively.

Because of concerns that agencies were awarding too many bonuses in the first year, the Congress reduced the number of SES members who could receive awards from 50 to 25 percent. In July 1980, OPM further limited performance awards (unless OPM concurrence was obtained) to 20 percent of eligible career executives. This 20-percent limitation was subsequently included in appropriation bills for fiscal years 1982 and 1983.

Personnel officials (directors of personnel and officials in charge of agency SES programs) in 25 of 26 agencies we visited told us that their agencies used performance appraisals in deciding who receives bonuses and awards. Similarly, 75 percent of the senior executives who responded to our survey on SES performance appraisal systems told us they believed their ratings were used at least to some extent in bonus and award decisions. However, both the personnel officials and senior executives believe that the motivational goal behind bonuses and awards is not being achieved and both groups are concerned with the fairness of bonus and award systems.

Their concerns are related, in part, to the reduction in the number of senior executives that can receive awards. We received many comments from SES members on our performance appraisal questionnaire that bonus system limitations represent a "breach of contract" and are thus a disincentive to excellence. In addition, many SES members believe that decisions on bonuses are not directly related to performance. Personnel officials told us that factors other than performance are considered in making bonus awards.

To be sure, this situation is not new. We reported in September 1981 that upper level executives receive a larger share of awards because agencies use factors which favor upper levels, in addition to performance, to determine who receives awards. These factors include

- --job importance, complexity, and difficulty,
- --degree of risk and responsibility,
- --organizational commitment (willingness to move, serve on organizational task forces, participate as an instructor in training programs), and
- -- the attitude that no subordinate should receive greater compensation than his/her superior.

Our review of bonuses paid during fiscal years 1981 and 1982 showed that higher level SES members are still more likely to receive a bonus than other SES members. (See app. VIII through XVI.)

The limit on bonuses contained in appropriation bills has not been renewed for fiscal year 1984. OPM, however, is issuing guidance to agencies on the bonus and award program for 1984. This guidance states that while the law allows 50 percent of eligible SES members to receive awards, awards generally should not exceed 30 to 35 percent of an agency's career appointees. In our opinion, while the increase in the number of SES members that can receive awards will alleviate, to some degree, the concerns expressed with bonuses, some of the negative feelings directed at the limitation contained in appropriation bills may continue because the limit is still below that allowed in the act.

## Dealing with poor performers

The act provided simplified procedures for dealing with poor performers. According to the act, any senior executive receiving an unsatisfactory rating was to be reassigned, transferred, or removed from SES. Any senior executive who received two unsatisfactory ratings in any period of 5 consecutive years was to be removed from SES. Any senior executive who received a less than fully successful rating in 2 of any 3 consecutive years was to be removed from SES. The act also gave agencies the authority to reduce the pay level of a senior executive.

We found that few senior executives have received less than fully successful ratings since the creation of SES--a total of 75 less than fully successful ratings have been given to senior executives. Further, we found few actions, as described in the

act, taken to deal with poor performance. As of June 30, 1983, two individuals had taken early retirement as a result of poor performance ratings and one individual had been terminated for poor performance during the 1-year probationary period established by the act as a "test" period for new senior executives. (See app. XVII.)

We also looked at reductions in pay levels to determine if this type of action was being taken with poor performers. We found 124 SES members had been reduced at least one pay level; however, only two had been rated less than fully successful. OPM officials told us that pay level reductions are sometimes related to interagency transfers or agency budget cuts.

personnel officials in 25 of 26 agencies told us that SES members who performed poorly may be reassigned to a position which agency officials believe is more suited to the SES members' talents—a remedy called for in the act—even though they have not been given unsuccessful ratings.

The act also provides that an individual who is removed from SES for poor performance with 25 years of service, or 20 years of service if age 50, can take early retirement. Since July 1979, 204 SES members have taken early retirement. Two retired early under the poor performance provision, 135 retired early because of an agency-initiated action—their position was abolished and another acceptable position could not be found or they refused to accept a geographic reassignment. We compared the performance ratings of these 135 executives with performance

ratings of all SES members and found that, while the 135 were generally rated fully successful, they were rated lower as a group than SES members as a whole. Thus, agencies may be using the early retirement option without giving unsuccessful ratings. (See app. XVIII through XIX.)

# AGENCY FLEXIBILITY IN MANAGING EXECUTIVE RESOURCES

The Civil Service Reform Act made two changes that gave agencies greater flexibility in managing executive resources. The act (1) gave agencies the authority to establish and fill executive positions and (2) established a rank-in-person as opposed to a rank-in-position system which increased agencies' flexibility to reassign executives.

# Allocation, establishment, and filling of SES positions

Before the act, the Civil Service Commission was responsible for approving (1) the allocation of a slot for a supergrade position, (2) the position description, and (3) the technical and managerial qualifications of the person selected to fill an approved position. When an agency abolished a position, the slot for that position could not be used by the agency but automatically reverted to the Civil Service Commission.

The act established a biennial allocation process. Agencies request slots for 2 fiscal years prior to the beginning of each even numbered fiscal year, and OPM allocates slots within the 10,778 limit set by the Congress. Each agency establishes

and fills positions it believes are appropriate. Agency Executive Review Boards review the technical qualifications of potential senior executives, and OPM Qualification Review Boards review the managerial qualifications of potential senior executives. Between July 13, 1979, and March 31, 1983, there were 2,972 submissions for Qualification Review Board action. All but two were approved. One was disapproved by the Board and a second was closed without action.

While OPM's role has been reduced from that of the Civil Service Commission, OPM retains responsibility for oversight of agency actions to assure that positions are not included in SES that do not justify an SES level. OPM's oversight mechanisms include (1) the review of agency justifications for the number of SES slots, (2) the Qualification Review Board's review, and (3) onsite evaluations conducted by OPM program officials.

During the allocation process, OPM reviews position descriptions for the requested slots, along with staffing and organization charts, to determine which new positions justify an SES level. The determination is largely subjective; the only written criteria that define an SES position are the five broad categories contained in the act. If OPM decides that a

<sup>1</sup>The five categories are: (1) directs the work of an organizational unit, (2) is held accountable for the success of one or more specific programs or projects, (3) monitors progress toward organizational goals and periodically conducts and makes adjustments to such goals, (4) supervises the work of employees other than personal assistants, and (5) otherwise exercises important policymaking, policy determining, or other executive functions.

position does not justify an SES level, it can withhold a slot for that position. The final decision on the number of slots allocated rests with the OPM Director. (See app. XX.)

Under the act, agencies have a great deal of flexibility.

Once OPM allocates an SES slot to an agency, the agency has the authority to establish and fill the position approved by OPM or to use the slot for a position other than the one used to justify the slot. OPM has historically allocated substantially more slots than agencies have used to establish positions.

Similarly, agencies establish substantially more positions than are generally filled.

OPM can review established positions when agencies submit merit staffing selections for Qualification Review Board review. At that point, OPM can stop the submission to the Qualification Review Board and negotiate with the agency to disestablish a position it does not believe belongs in SES. OPM can also withdraw a slot if an agency establishes what OPM deems is an inappropriate SES position. However, unless filling the position requires Qualification Review Board action, this review will not take place. For example, the Qualification Review Board would not review a position being filled by reassignment of a current SES member.

OPM has conducted about 100 onsite evaluations since SES was created. These evaluations are to cover the entire SES program at an installation. Part of these evaluations is a review of selected SES positions to determine if they belong in SES.

OPM staff available to conduct these evaluations is limited. Also, because of the short time for onsite reviews (2 weeks or less), OPM focuses on recently established positions or positions which were questioned during the allocation process. If OPM identifies an inappropriate SES position during the onsite evaluations, it negotiates with the agency to disestablish that position. OPM officials told us that, to avoid disruption, they do not request agencies to disestablish filled positions but instead ask them to take action when the positions become vacant.

OPM has not maintained records on the number of positions questioned during its reviews. As a result, we were not able to evaluate the effectiveness of these processes in identifying and correcting misclassification of positions by agencies.

## Increased flexibility to reassign

A major problem noted in the debate leading to passage of the Civil Service Reform Act was the lack of flexibility agencies had to match executive talent to agency needs. Prior to the act, individuals could not be reassigned to lesser graded positions without an adverse action, and OPM had to review reassignments to ensure that new positions were of equal rank.

The act provided agency heads with a simplified mechanism for matching senior executive talents with agency needs—the rank—in—person system. The rank—in—person system provides that senior executives can be assigned to virtually any SES position in an agency—regardless of its hierarchical position within the

organization. As a result, SES members can now be reassigned without an adverse action or a review by OPM.

Of all SES provisions, perhaps none has created more controversy than this increased flexibility to reassign. Personnel officials in 16 of the 26 agencies we visited were pleased with the SES reassignment provision. Senior executives, however, feel that they are not protected from arbitrary actions to the same extent they were under the pre-Civil Service Reform Act system. They are also concerned about geographic relocations, which can involve large out-of-pocket expenses. Legislation has recently been introduced (H.R. 3852) which increases the amount paid by the government for geographic relocation. If this bill is enacted, we believe senior executives would be more adequately compensated for the costs of relocations.

personnel officials in 18 of 26 agencies we visited stated that, under the act, it is easier to reassign members. They believed they could move senior executives more easily into positions where their talents could be best utilized. At the same time, officials in 16 of the 26 agencies agreed that senior executives had less protection from arbitrary actions than before the act. Statistics provided by OPM show that reassignments are increasing. In fiscal year 1980, there were 1,005 SES reassignments government-wide. In fiscal year 1982, the number had increased to 1,226. (See app. XXI.)

One factor which may be contributing to SES members' views toward reassignments is the way in which some agencies are using

the rank-in-person system. Personnel officials in 18 of 26 agencies stated that they were still using—at least partly—the old position management system. For example, Office of Management and Budget officials and Department of the Treasury officials told us that from a hierarchical standpoint, upper—level positions are reserved for ES-5s and ES-6s. This continued use of the old position management system in some agencies may be serving to weaken senior executives' faith in the reassignment process.

SES members have also become increasingly concerned that they have little or no say in the reassignment process. At the Department of the Interior, for example, where a vigorous reassignment program—the Career Enhancement Program—was started last December, 8 of the 22 senior executives reassigned stated that they had no say in their reassignment. At 4 of the other 25 agencies we visited, officials stated that senior executives had no say about their own reassignments or geographic relocations.

SES members are also concerned about the cost of geographic reassignments. Individuals who are reassigned are often faced with expenses that the government does not reimburse, such as financing a new home at a higher interest rate. (See app. XXII.) We did note that the number of geographic reassignments has decreased from 188 in fiscal year 1980 to 172 in fiscal year 1982.

In addition to reassignments within an agency, several individuals expressed the belief prior to passage of the Civil Service Reform Act that the act would encourage transfers between agencies. We found that interagency transfers have decreased. In fiscal year 1980 there were 140 interagency transfers. This decreased to 84 in fiscal year 1981 and rose again somewhat to 119 in fiscal year 1982. Transfers among Department of Defense agencies, which increased in these years, accounted for a large percentage of the total transfers. In fiscal year 1980 there were 20 Defense Department transfers, accounting for 14.3 percent of all transfers, and in fiscal year 1982 there were 31 Defense Department transfers, accounting for 26.1 percent of all transfers. (See app. XXIII.)

## SES POLITICIZATION SAFEGUARDS

One of the goals spelled out by the Civil Service Reform

Act was to provide a Senior Executive Service ". . . free from

improper political interference." Congressional concerns about

improper political interference were two-fold: first, that too

many noncareer executives might change the overall nonpartisan

nature of the civil service--particularly where positions re
quiring impartial federal executives were concerned; and second,

that new agency administrators would not take the time to

properly assess career senior executives before making decisions

on their performance or using the flexibility created by the act

to reassign them to new or different duties.

In response to these concerns, the Congress incorporated certain protections in the law. To prevent an unchecked influx of noncareer senior executives, it restricted noncareer appointees to 10 percent of all SES positions and 25 percent of SES positions at individual agencies. In addition, limited term and limited emergency appointees<sup>2</sup> could not exceed 5 percent of all SES positions and certain positions (for which it is necessary to assure impartiality or the perception of impartiality on the part of the government) could only be filled by career senior executives. To ensure that new agency administrators or noncareer supervisors do not take premature steps to reassign or evaluate the performance of career senior executives in their agencies, the Congress established a "get acquainted" period during which a career senior executive may not be

- --involuntarily reassigned within 120 days after the appointment of the head of an agency, or
- --involuntarily reassigned within 120 days after the appointment of a noncareer supervisor who has the authority to reassign, or
- --rated within 120 days after the beginning of a new presidential administration.

<sup>2</sup>A limited term appointment is a nonrenewable appointment for a term of 3 years or less to an SES position, the duties of which expire at the end of such term. A limited emergency appointment is a nonrenewable appointment, not to exceed 18 months, to an SES position to meet an unanticipated, urgent need.

We found that the safeguards specified by the Congress have been adhered to by the agencies. We found, for example, that the number of noncareer senior executives, while increasing since the act was passed, has not exceeded 10 percent of SES positions and that the number of limited term and limited emergency appointments has never exceeded 1 percent of the total SES positions—far below the 5 percent limit set as a safeguard by the Congress. We also found that the number of career reserved positions—those which can only be filled by career executives—has increased from 3,377 in July 1979 to 3,798 in March 1983, while the number of general positions—those which can be filled by both career and noncareer executives—has declined from 4,300 to 4,063 during the same period. (See app. XXV through XXVII.)

We also looked at conversions of positions from career reserved to general to determine if extensive changes in the make up of the career reserved group have occurred within the total numbers. We found that only 21 positions have been converted from career reserved to general since July 13, 1979—and 7 of these were filled by noncareer employees as of June 30, 1983. (See app. XXIV.)

We did not look specifically at the 120-day get acquainted period during this review. However, in earlier work we examined problems associated with the change in administrations and found that the actions taken by OPM to monitor SES during presidential transition were adequate. Similarly, the Merit Systems

Protection Board, in a September 1981 report on SES, stated that as of mid-March 1981, there were no indications of any wide-spread abuses of the 120-day period for career SES members.

Although the number of noncareer SES members has not exceeded the 10-percent limit included in the law, we believe that the method used by OPM to report the relationship between career and noncareer employees may be misleading. OPM reports the number of noncareer senior executives as a percent of total SES slot allocations rather than as a percent of positions established or senior executives onboard. There is a difference. As of March 31, 1983, there were 8,211 SES slots allocated to agencies government-wide, while 7,861 positions were established and 6,873 positions were filled. The number of noncareer senior executives onboard as of March 31, 1983, was 670, which is 8.2 percent of the allocated positions; 8.5 percent of the established positions; or 9.7 percent of the filled positions.

The Congress may want to instruct OPM to report noncareer positions as a percent of senior executives onboard and positions established in addition to its current report which uses the number of slots allocated—particularly since there are 1,338 more slots allocated than senior executives onboard.

### MANAGERIAL COMPETENCY

The Civil Service Reform Act provided for the establishment of executive development programs to improve the managerial competence of SES candidates and incumbents. The act provided

that these programs could include use of innovative methods such as sabbaticals.

We are currently preparing a report on our review of executive development programs administered by five agencies and of OPM's executive development role. During that review, executive development programs generally received high marks from SES incumbents and SES candidates. Officials at the five agencies told us that they favor systematic development of SES candidates and incumbents and have placed a great deal of emphasis on development programs. SES candidates told us that the development programs have better prepared them to take on SES level responsibilities, while SES incumbents told us that agencies' incumbent development activities have helped them perform their jobs better. Personnel officials we interviewed at 26 agencies also spoke very favorably of SES development programs.

We found that the majority of training provided SES incumbents was managerial as opposed to technical. This was even more the case for candidates than for SES incumbents. At the five agencies we reviewed, about 87 percent of the candidate training was managerial, the remainder covered technical subjects. For incumbents, 60 percent of training covered management subjects while 40 percent was technical.

We did find that senior executives are not using sabbaticals. The act allows an agency head to grant a sabbatical to career appointees for a period not to exceed 11 months to permit the senior executive to engage in study or an uncompensated work

experience which will contribute to the executive's development and effectiveness. The act and OPM guidance provide certain restrictions on sabbaticals.

According to OPM data, only seven individuals have taken or are taking sabbaticals. Personnel officials identified an additional four individuals. Personnel officials told us sabbaticals are seldom used because of (1) the restrictions imposed by the act and by OPM guidance, (2) the reluctance of senior executives to leave their positions for long periods of time, and (3) the amount of paperwork needed to apply for and justify a sabbatical. (See app. XXVIII.)

Personnel officials we interviewed in 20 agencies pointed out that managerial competency may be adversely affected in the future because SES pay and benefits are not adequate to attract and retain top quality managers. They told us that while this has not affected recruitment from among the ranks of GS-15s, it does make recruiting executives from private industry more difficult. A related problem personnel officials pointed out was the difficulty they have recruiting high quality individuals with experience in the technical/scientific fields. Agencies frequently offer SES positions to attract these individuals; however, since SES is comprised of managers, it is sometimes difficult to justify the managerial qualifications of scientists to the Qualification Review Board.

Let me conclude by expressing the view that, in general, progress is being made in achieving the Congress' objectives in

establishing SES. Agencies have greater flexibility in using their executive resources; management processes are being rationalized and improved as executives establish their individual performance goals; it is easier to deal with ineffective managers; and greater emphasis is being placed on executive development. Some SES members, however, are concerned with how agencies are using their enhanced management abilities. Undeniably, there are problems that require attention. It is difficult to say how widespread these problems are.

Finally, I would like to share with you a personal view of SES, based on my private sector experience. In the private sector, I was able to hire and retain quality people by paying adequate salaries. I recognize that the degree of flexibility in paying salaries and bonuses that exists in the private sector is not feasible in the federal government. However, the act provided for positive changes in these areas which have not come to pass. Limitations have been placed on salaries that can be paid to executives. These limitations have adversely affected the government's ability to hire and keep top quality execu-Agency managers have been hamstrung in their ability to reward deserving individuals because of the limitations that have been placed on the number of executives that can receive bonuses. In my view, such salary and bonus limitations may adversely affect the act's goal of developing a highly competent executive corps.

I endorse raising the number of bonuses that can be awarded as OPM suggests in its guidelines which would provide for a 30 to 35 percent limit. I recognize that the current limit of 20 percent was set because of the perception that too many bonuses were being awarded during the first year. I expect that the agencies have learned a lesson and will be more prudent in the future. I would also like to point out that it would not be costly to give more bonuses. For example, based on the average bonus award in fiscal year 1982, increasing the number of bonuses to 40 percent of the career SES members would cost \$14 Increasing the number to 50 percent would cost \$18 million. Such increases are small in relation to the federal million. payroll but could do much to alleviate SES members' negative views on the bonus program and help achieve the act's goals.

Accordingly, I believe it would be prudent to increase the number of positions eligible for bonuses by 5 to 10 percent each year for the next few years until they reach the 50-percent limit envisioned by the act. If OPM declines to take this step, which in my view would increase the probability of maintaining a highly competent executive corps, the Congress may wish to act to do so. I would offer the services of our Office to provide the Congress continuing assurance that the agencies are administering the bonus program fairly and equitably in the future.

Attached to this statement are various statistical analyses related to the areas we reviewed.

## $\underline{C} \underline{o} \underline{n} \underline{t} \underline{e} \underline{n} \underline{t} \underline{s}$

Appendix		Page
I	Objectives, scope, and methodology	1
II	Number of SES positions allocated, established, filled, and vacant	3
III -	Number of SES members by sex, race, and national origin	4
IV	SES members in each pay rate	5
v	Number of Senior executives leaving government service - July 13, 1979, to June 30, 1983	6
VI	Statutory and presidential exclusions from SES	7
VII	SES members with 5 years continuous civil service experience prior to joining SES	8
VIII	Number and dollar amount of bonuses awarded SES members - fiscal years 1980 through 1982	9
IX	Number of rank award recipients - fiscal years 1980 through 1982	11
х	Number of SES members who received both meritorious and distinguished executive rank awards - July 13, 1979, to September 30, 1983	12
XI	Bonus recipients in various performance ratings - fiscal years 1980 through 1982	13
XII	Executive level of SES members receiving bonuses - fiscal years 1981 and 1982	14
XIII	Distribution of cash incentive awards to SES members - July 13, 1979, to April 27, 1983	15
XIV	Number of SES bonuses by geographic location - fiscal years 1980 through 1982	16
xv	Number of SES members who received bonuses - July 13, 1979, to September 30, 1982	17
IVX	Distribution of multiple cash awards to SES members - fiscal years 1980 through 1982	18

Appendix		Page
XVII	Number of less than fully successful perform- ance ratings - fiscal years 1980 through 1982	19
IIIVX	Comparison of early retirements to total SES retirements	20
XIX	Comparison of performance ratings for SES members who retired early with those who have received performance ratings	21
xx	Comparison of selected agencies' SES slots: Fiscal years 1982 and 1983 requests, OPM analysts recommendations, OPM Director's approved allocations	22
XXI	SES reassignments - July 13, 1979, to March 31, 1983	26
XXII	Letter on costs of geographic reassignments	27
XXIII	SES interagency transfers - July 13, 1979, to March 31, 1983	30
XXIV	Conversions from noncareer to career appointments - July 13, 1979, to September 30, 1983	31
xxv	Compliance with the statutory limits on non- career, limited term, and limited emergency appointments	33
IVXX	Changes between career reserved and general SES positions - July 13, 1979, to June 30, 1983	34
IIVXX	Number of career reserved and general positions	35
XXVTTT	List of sabbaticals as of September 30, 1983	36

APPENDIX I

#### OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

On October 13, 1982, and March 24, 1983, the Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Civil Service, House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, raised several questions on the progress of SES during its first 5 years of operation which she wanted GAO to consider in conducting an overall assessment of the program. We reviewed the legislative history of SES to determine what specific changes the Congress sought to achieve by remodeling the government's pay and personnel system for senior executives. On the basis of this review, we focused on four broad questions that encompassed the major concerns expressed during debate on the passage of the Civil Service Reform Act as well as the questions raised by the Chairwoman. These questions were:

- --How are agencies fixing the accountability of senior executives for program operations?
- --How are agencies using the flexibility provided by the act to manage executive resources more effectively?
- --Have agencies complied with the act's safeguards to prevent politicizing SES?
- -- Has the creation of SES had an impact on managerial competence?

Our review work consisted of five basic elements:

- Analysis of information from the Office of Personnel Management's Executive Personnel Management Data Information System.
- Review of other ongoing and prior GAO work on SES.
- 3. Interviews with personnel directors and officials responsible for managing SES programs at 26 agencies.
- 4. Review of the Office of Personnel Management's management and oversight of the SES personnel system.
- 5. Review of the results of other studies of SES.

We obtained and analyzed data available from the Office of Personnel Management's Executive Personnel Management Data Information System which tracks SES positions and people. Information obtained from that system enabled us to study relationships affecting our review questions.

We reviewed the results of other ongoing and prior GAO work related to SES. Two ongoing reviews are a review of SES performance appraisal systems and a review of executive development programs. From the review of SES performance appraisal systems, we analyzed the results of a questionnaire sent to a sample of SES members at 10 agencies and to a randomly selected government-wide sample

APPENDIX I

of SES members. From the review of executive development systems, we drew on the results of interviews with SES candidates and incumbents in five agencies. Prior GAO work on SES covered several topics including the initial conversion to SES, the effects of the changes in administrations, and SES pay and bonuses.

We interviewed personnel directors and officials responsible for managing the SES program at 26 federal agencies to obtain their views on our questions, on problems and benefits of the SES system, the effectiveness of the Office of Personnel Management's management of the SES personnel system, and changes needed in the SES program. The 26 agencies included the 13 cabinet agencies, 11 of the largest noncabinet agencies, and the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Merit Systems Protection Board. The 13 cabinet and 11 noncabinet agencies were chosen because they employ the largest number of SES members. The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Merit Systems Protection Board were chosen because of their relatively small size and unique structures. The 26 agencies, in total, encompassed 91 percent of the government's established SES positions.

We reviewed the Office of Personnel Management's regulations and guidance to agencies concerning SES, interviewed officials responsible for providing assistance to agencies concerning SES, and reviewed the steps in the process of allocating SES slots to agencies. In addition, we reviewed reports of the Office of Personnel Management's onsite evaluations of SES programs to determine the extent of these evaluations.

We also reviewed the results of studies of SES done by the Merit Systems Protection Board, the Office of Personnel Management, the Federal Executive Institute's Alummi Association, and the House Subcommittee on Civil Service. This work provided background on the progress of SES and alerted us to problems already identified related to our four basic questions.

We performed our work in accordance with generally accepted government audit standards.

#### NUMBER OF SES POSITIONS ALLOCATED,

#### ESTABLISHED, FILLFD, AND VACANT

	July 13, 1979	Sept. 30, 1980	Sept 30, 1981	Sept. 30, 1982	March 31, 1983
= 1.1 at and				•	
Total number of SES			0.500	0 007	0 211
positions allocated	8,389	8,592	8,593	8,227	8,211
Total number of SES					
<ul> <li>positions established</li> </ul>	7,677	8,210	8,136	7,932	7,861
Percent of allocated				•	
positions established	91.5	95.6	94.7	96.4	95.7
Total number of SES					
positions filled	6,948	7,038	6,481	6,762	6,873
Career	(6,318)	(6,325)	(5,942)	(6,042)	(6,117)
Noncareer	(489)	(582)	(467)	(648)	(670)
Limited term	(29)	(59)	(36)	(40)	(53)
Limited emergency	(0)	(18)	(6)	(7)	(7)
Filled by non-SES					
member <sup>ā</sup>	(112)	(54)	(30)	(25)	(26)
Total number of SES	` ,	, ,	, ,	, ,	, ,
positions vacant	729	1,172	1,655	1,170	988
Percent of established		·	• •	•	
positions vacant	9.5	14.3	20.3	14.8	12.6

<sup>a</sup>Generally these are executives who did not convert to SES. It may also include non-SES members temporarily occupying SES positions.

APPENDIX III

#### Approved For Release 2008/09/12: CIA-RDP86B00338R000400500009-6

#### NUMBER OF SES MEMBERS BY SEX, RACE, AND NATIONAL ORIGIN

Sex, race, and national origin	Sept. 3 Number	0, 1979 <sup>a</sup> Percent	Sept. 3 Number	0, 1980 <sup>b</sup> Percent	Sept. 3 Number	Percent	Sept. 3 Number	1982 <sup>d</sup> Percent		1983 <sup>e</sup> Percent
White males	5,849	90.2	<u>6,036</u>	87.4	5,686	88.4	5,920	88.0	6,023	87.6
White females Black males Black females Hispanic males Hispanic females Asian/Pacific	272 226 37 47 3	4.2 3.5 0.6 0.7 0.0	379 287 58 63 8	5.5 4.2 0.8 0.9 0.1	313 250 51 52 7	4.9 3.9 0.8 0.8	359 243 48 61 7	5.4 3.6 0.7 0.9 0.1	386 254 52 64 10	5.6 3.7 0.8 0.9 0.1
Island males Asian/Pacific Island females American Indian and Alaskan	30 1	0.5	40 1	0.6	<b>41</b> 0	0.6	52 2	0.0	52 3	0.8
males American Indian and Alaskan females	0	0.3	0	0.5	0	0.5	0	0.5	0	0.5
Subtotal fe- males and minorities Total <sup>f</sup>	639 6,488	9.8 100.0	869	12.6	749	11.6	805	12.0	852	12.4
iocai-	0,488	100.0	6,905	100.0	6,435	100.0	6,725	100.0	6,875	100.0

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>Information was not available on 292 individuals.

bInformation was not available on 79 individuals.

CInformation was not available on 16 individuals.

dInformation was not available on 12 individuals.

eInformation was not available on 4 individuals.

 $f_{\mbox{\scriptsize Data}}$  does not include non-SES members filling SES slots.

### SES MEMBERS IN EACH PAY RATE

SES pay rate	July 13 Number	Percent	Sept. 3	0, 1980 Percent	Sept. 3	90, 1981 Percent	Sept. 3	Percent	March : Number	Percent
1	364	5.3	664	9.5	603	9.4	639	9.5	543	7.9
ż	324	4.7	455	6.5	523	8.1	612	9.1	623	9.1
2 3	501	7.3	730	10.5	756	11.7	1,047	15.5	1,111	16.2
4	4,716	69.0	4,174	59.8	3,614	56.0	3,450	51.2	3,477	50.8
<b>4</b> 5	702	10.3	721	10.3	732	11.3	751	11.2	820	. 12.0
6	224	3.3	240	3.4	223	3.5	237	3.5	273	4.0
Data										
missing	5	0.1	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.0	0	0.0
Total	6,836	100.0	6,984	100.0	6,451	100.0	6,737	100.0	6,847	100.0
Average pay rate	3.	84	;	3.65	;	3.62	:	3.56		3.62
Pay rate groupings										
1-3	1,189	17.3	1,849	26.5	1,882	29.2	2,298	34.1	2,277	33.2
4	4,716	69.0	4,174	59.8	3,614	56.0	3,450	51.2	3,477	50.8
5–6	926	13.6	961	13.7	955	14.8	988	14.7	1,093	16.0

J

APPENDIX V

#### NUMBER OF SENIOR EXECUTIVES LEAVING GOVERNMENT SERVICE

#### JULY 13, 1979, TO JUNE 30, 1983

Reason for leaving	Number leavinga
Resignation	1,663
Early retirement (performance provisionb)	2
Early retirement (other <sup>C</sup> )	202
Optional retirement <sup>d</sup>	1,358
Disability retirement	43
Termination during probation	· 1
Reduction in force	8
Death	63
Other	<u> 146</u>
Total	3,486 <sup>e</sup>
	<del></del>

<sup>a</sup>In addition, about 200 senior executives have retreated to GS-15 positions. According to OPM officials, four of those were initiated by the agency for performance reasons. Two reasons mentioned by OPM officials for voluntary retreating were personal reasons and desire to avoid a geographic transfer.

bIndividuals with less than fully satisfactory performance are permitted to retire early rather than being removed from SES in some other manner, if they are at least age 50 with 20 years of service, or any age if they have completed a minimum of 25 years of service.

CEarly retirements are permitted, under certain conditions, provided the individual is at least age 50 with 20 years of service, or any age with 25 years of service. Generally, OPM authorizes an early retirement because of a major reduction in force, reorganization, or transfer of function; a position abolishment without being able to offer the affected employee an acceptable available position; or a refusal to accept a directed geographic transfer.

demployees covered by civil service retirement can elect to retire if they are at least age 55 with 30 years of service, age 60 with 20 years of service, or age 62 with 5 years of service.

eAbout 2,550 of these individuals are career senior executives who converted to SES on July 13, 1979. They represent over 40 percent of the senior executives who converted to SES.

APPENDIX VI

### STATUTORY AND PRESIDENTIAL EXCLUSIONS FROM SES

#### STATUTORY EXCLUSIONS

Administrative Office of the United States Courts Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Federal Election Commission Federal Reserve Board General Accounting Office Library of Congress Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corporation Presidential Commission on Personnel Interchange President's Commission on White House Fellows United States Postal Service United States Tax Court Government Printing Office Export-Import Bank Overseas Private Investment Corporation Panama Canal Commission Inter-American Foundation Veterans Administration, Department of Medicine and Surgery (160 positions) President's Commission on Study of Ethical Problems in Research Peace Corp National Gallery of Art Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation United States Holocaust Memorial Council Delaware River Basin Commission Susquehanna River Basin Commission Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board Central Intelligence Agency Defense Intelligence Agency National Security Agency Federal Election Commission State Department (Foreign Service Officers)

#### PRESIDENTIAL EXCLUSIONS

Assistant United States Attorneys, Department of Justice National Security Council Staff

#### SES MEMBERS WITH 5-YEARS CONTINUOUS

#### CIVIL SERVICE EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO JOINING SFS

	July 13, 1979	Sept. 30, 1980	Sept. 30, 1981	Sept. 30, 1982	March 31, 1983
Total number of SES members <sup>b</sup> Number of SES members with 5-years continuous serv- ice in civil service	6,836	6,984	6,451	6,737	6,847
prior to joining SES Percent of SES members with 5-years continuous service in civil serv- ice prior to joining	5,903	5,873 <sup>c</sup>	5,446	5,606	5,673 <sup>d</sup>
SES	86.4	84.1	84.4	83.2	82.9

The act required that not more than 30 percent of SES positions may be filled by individuals who did not have 5 years of current continuous service in the civil service immediately preceding their initial appointment to SES, unless the President certifies to the Congress that the limitation would hinder the efficiency of the government.

boos not include SES positions filled by non-SES members.

CAs of December 31, 1980.

dAs of December 31, 1982.

#### NUMBER AND DOLLAR AMOUNT OF BONUSES AWARDED SES MEMBERS

### FISCAL YEARS 1980 THROUGH 1982

	Fiscal	year 1980	Fiscal	year 1981	Fiscal	year 1982
	Number	Dollar	Number	Dollar	Number	Dollar
Agency/department	awarded	amount	awarded	amount	awarded	amount
	<del></del>	(thousands)		(thousands)		(thousands)
3	0	, \$ 0.0	65	\$ 325.2	52	\$ 328.2
Agriculture Commerce	0	0.0	79	433.2	68	371.3
Defense	157	806.4	204	1,160.4	227	1,432.7
	137	000.4	204	1710004	22,	.,
Office of Secretary of Defense	(0)	(0.0)	(53)	(325.9)	(56)	(318.2)
	(37)	(168.0)	(30)	(156.5)	(33)	(185.0)
Air Force	(49)	(260.2)	(51)	(309.2)	(60)	(431.0)
Army	(49) (71)	(378.2)	(70)	(368.8)	(78)	(498.5)
Navy	(71)	0.0	10	50.0	8	58.0
Education	103	560 <b>.</b> 5	105	586.7	91	540.2
Energy	103	200.2	105	300.7	21	340.2
Environmental Protection	•		46	287.8	36	239.3
Agency	0	0.0	40	207.0	30	239.3
General Services	4.5		•		20	127.5
Administration	10	42.5	0	0.0		
Health and Human Services	54	274.5	66	344.5	104	678.9
Housing and Urban						
Development	0	0.0	20	115.5	14	66.5
Interior	50	296.5	47	299.0	38	283.5
Justice	47	265.8	37	228.5	40	287.9
Labor	33	200.8	0	0.0	28	144.8
Merit Systems Protection						
Board	4	35.5	2	11.5	2	16.0
National Aeronautics and						
Space Administration	238	1,338.3	89	515.9	83	609.1
National Science						
Foundation	0.	0.0	18	90.0	18	145.0
Nuclear Regulatory						
Commission	35	209.9	33	218.0	37	279.5

Agency/department	Fiscal Number awarded	year 1980 Dollar amount (thousands)	Fiscal Number awarded	year 1981 Dollar amount (thousands)	Fiscal Number awarded	year 1982 Dollar amount (thousands)
Office of Management and Budget	11	49.0	0	0.0	28	175.0
Office of Personnel Management	2	11.5	13	67.6	12	55.1
Securities and Exchange Commission	0	0.0	11	69.5	7	50.0
State	10	73.0	8 56	50.8 329.0	11 61	80.3 375.3
Transportation Treasury	0 46	0.0 243.5	85	468.8	91	547.2
Veterans Administration	41	199.5	40	226.0	5	39.4
Subtotal	841	\$4,607.2	1,034	\$5,877.9	1,081	\$6,930.7
Other agencies	<u>67</u>	421.1	91	548.7	49	308.0
Total	908	\$5,028.3	1,125	\$6,426.6	1,130	\$7,238.7

Note: Data in chart represents bonuses awarded for performance during fiscal years 1980, 1981, and 1982, but not necessarily paid during the fiscal years. For example, if the performance rating was received in September 1981 (fiscal year 1981) and the bonus was paid in October 1981 (fiscal year 1982), the data will appear in fiscal year 1981. Also, according to OPM officials, where zeros are shown in the table no awards were made by the agencies.

5

APPENDIX IX

## NUMBER OF RANK AWARDS RECIPIENTS FISCAL YEARS 1980 THROUGH 1982b

		33b.com	of individual	s receiving ran	k awards	
		Number				year 1982
Agency/	Fiscal	year 1980		Distinguished	Meritorious	Distinguished
department	Meritorious	Distinguished	Met I con I com	020.1		
Gebat diesic		_		0	8	2
a 1 3 b	12	2	,	ĭ	9	2
Agriculture	15	1		10	AA	11
Commerce	47	10	31	10	Ti .	1
Defense	Ö	0	3		10	3
<b>Education</b>	18	3	10	1	10	Ĭ.
Energy	, o	4	2	1	,	i
Environmental Protection Agency	ő	0	0	Ō		<b>.</b>
General Services Administration	22	3	2	2	10	•
Health and Human Services	<b>'</b> •	2	0	1	4	ŭ
Housing and Urban Development	2	î	Ō	0	4	2
Interior	9	'n	2	0	4	2
Justice	4	1	ī	0	2	Ü
Tahor	3	,	i	0	0	. 0
Morit Systems Protection Board	0	U	•			
National Aeronautics and Space			1.4	4	16	3
Administration	21	4	17	Ō	2	1
National Science Foundation	0	1	Ÿ	ň	2	0
Nuclear Regulatory Commission	1	1	4	1	Ō	0
Office of Management and Budget	. 2	2	Ų	i	Ō	0
Office of Personnel Management	3	1	!	V	ž	1
Office of Personnel Malagement	·n 0	0	1	,0	7	2
Security and Exchange Commission	71 2	1	2	Ü	;	1
State	11	4	4	1	11	i
Transportation	13	4	5	1	';	į
Treasurv	,,	i	3	. <u> </u>		_ <del></del>
Veterans Administration		<del></del>	_			38
•	202	46	93	24	158	30
Subtotal	202	10			_	^
		1	3	_1	3	
Other agencies	_4	<u> </u>				20
-	200	49	96	25	161	38
Total	206	47	====	-		

The act provided for the awarding of the rank of Meritorious Executive for sustained accomplishment and Distinguished Executive for sustained extraordinary accomplishment. The ranks include \$10,000 and \$20,000 cash awards, respectively.

bData is reported by the fiscal year in which the President approved the award.

APPENDIX X

APPENDIX X

## NUMBER OF SES MEMBERS WHO RECEIVED BOTH MERITORIOUS

## AND DISTINGUISHED EXECUTIVE RANK AWARDS<sup>a</sup>

## JULY 13, 1979, TO SEPTEMBER 30, 1982

Agency/department		awarded ranks
Commerce		1
Air Force		5
Army		1
Navy		1
Health and Human Services		3
National Aeronautics and Space Administration		7
State		1
Treasury	_	1
Total	2	20

The act provided for the awarding of the rank of Meritorious Executive for sustained accomplishment and Distinguished Executive for sustained extraordinary accomplishment. The ranks include \$10,000 and \$20,000 cash awards, respectively.

## BONUS RECIPIENTS IN VARIOUS PERFORMANCE RATINGS

#### FISCAL YEARS 1980 THROUGH 1982a

		Numb	er of SES me	embers
Fiscal year	Performance rating	Rated	Received bonuses	Percent of rated
1980	Less than fully successful <sup>b</sup>	25	0	0.0
	Fully successful but not top <sup>c</sup>	2,101	417	19.9
	Top <sup>d</sup>	1,069	491	45.9
1981	Less than fully successful <sup>b</sup>	33	0	0.0
	Fully successful but not top <sup>c</sup>	3,149	368	11.7
	Top <sup>d</sup>	2,164	757	35.0
1982	Less than fully successful <sup>b</sup>	17	0	0.0
	Fully successful but not top <sup>c</sup>	3,235	275	8.5
	Top <sup>d</sup>	2,448	855	34.9

<sup>a</sup>Data in chart represents bonuses awarded for performance during fiscal years 1980, 1981, and 1982, but not necessarily paid during the fiscal years. For example, if the performance rating was received in September 1981 (fiscal year 1981) and the bonus was paid in October 1981 (fiscal year 1982), the data will appear in fiscal year 1981.

bLess than fully successful are those individuals receiving an unsatisfactory or minimally satisfactory rating.

<sup>C</sup>Fully successful but not top are those individuals receiving a fully successful rating but not rated in the highest category possible within their organization.

dTop are those individuals rated in the highest category possible within their organization.

13

#### EXECUTIVE LEVEL OF SES MEMBERS RECEIVING BONUSES

## FISCAL YEARS 1981 AND 1982

			Fiscal yea	ır 1981			Fiscal yea	r 1982	982		
Executive		Career SES as of Sept.	30, 1981		bonuses <sup>a</sup>	Career SE as of Sept	. 30, 1982	SES me	_		
	<u>level</u>	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent		
	ES-1	450	7.6	36	3.0	479	7.9	22	2.1		
	ES-2	507	8.5	71	5.9	555	9.2	63	5.9		
	ES-3	702	11.8	81	6.8	928	15.4	114	10.7		
	ES-4	3,496	58.8	693	57 <b>.7</b>	3,307	54.7	601	56.4		
	ES-5	641	10.8	253	21.1	635	10.5	207	19.4		
	ES-6	146	2.5	66	5.5	138	2.3	58	5.5		
	Total	5,942	100.0	1,200	100.0	6,042	100.0	1,065	100.0		

 $^{
m a}{
m Data}$  is reported by the fiscal year in which the bonus was actually paid, and therefore differs from bonus data on appendices VIII, XI, and XIV.

APPENDIX XIII

#### DISTRIBUTION OF CASH INCENTIVE AWARDS TO SES MEMBERS

#### JULY 13, 1979, TO APRIL 27, 1983b

Agency/department	Mily 13, 1979 to September 30, 1979	Fiscal year 1980	Fiscal year 1981	Piscal year 1982	October 1, 1982 to April 27, 1983 <sup>C</sup>
Agriculture	0	19 13	2	5	0
Commerce	Ü	13	0	3	1
Defense	0	3	.2	2	Ü
Princetion	U	3	19	2	U
Energy	0	16	7	13	0
Environmental Protection Agenc		. 4	.30	6	1 ,
General Services Administration	n 0	Ō	2	3	3
Health and Human Services	0	12	5	9	7
Housing and Urban Development	0	9	0	3	0
Interior	0	1	1	3	0
Justice	0	0	3	7	1
Merit Systems Protection Board	. 0	2	0	4	0
National Aeronautics and Space					
Administration	0	7	7	4	· 0
National Science Foundation	0	1	9	6	1
Nuclear Regulatory Commission	0	3	2	0	0
Office of Personnel Management	0	0	0	0	1
Securities and Exchange					
Commission	0	1	1	0	0
State	0	0	0	1	0
Transportation	Ō	9	3	3	3
Treasury	16	21	7	20	11
Veterans Administration	1	19	5	7	3
vecerary remainstractors	<u> </u>				
Subtotal	17	143	111	101	35
Other agencies	_3	_20	_54	35	<u>11</u>
Total d	20	163	165	136	46

ASES members along with all other government employees may receive incentive awards in recognition of specific one-time accomplishments, suggestions, inventions, etc.

15

bData in chart represents incentive awards paid during the period indicated.

COther cash incentive awards may have been given but not yet reported by the agencies.

Online SES members received two awards. Porty-seven recipients were noncareer SES members and 8 were limited term appointees.

#### NUMBER OF BONUSES BY GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION

#### FISCAL YEARS 1980 THROUGH 1982a

:	Washingto	on, D.C. met	ro area		Field <sup>b</sup>		Total			
Fiscal year	Number of bonuses	Percent of bonuses	Average bonus	Number of bonuses	Percent of bonuses	Average bonus	Number of bonuses	Percent of bonuses	Average bonus	
1980	591	65.1	\$5,658	317	34.9	\$5,313	908	100.0	\$5,538	
1981	804	71.5	<b>\$5,778</b>	321	28.5	\$5,548	1,125	100.0	\$5,712	
1982	840	74.3	\$6,428	290	25.7	\$6,240	1,130	100.0	\$6,379	

aData in chart represents bonuses awarded for performance during fiscal years 1980, 1981, and 1982, but not necessarily paid during the fiscal years. For example, if the performance rating was received in September 1981 (fiscal year 1981) and the bonus was paid in October 1981 (fiscal year 1982), the data will appear in fiscal year 1981.

bAbout 26 to 27 percent of all senior executives—career, noncareer, limited term, and limited emergency appointees-are at field locations.

6

APPENDIX XV APPENDIX XV

## NUMBER OF SES MEMBERS WHO RECEIVED BONUSES

## JULY 13, 1979, TO SEPTEMBER 30, 1982a

	Senior	executives	receiving
	One	Two	Three
Agency/department	bonus	bonuses	bonuses
- •	. 0.5	16	0
Agriculture	85 110	16 20	0
Commerce			<del>-</del>
Defense	277 9	106 4	1 <u>4</u> 0
Education	•	•	
Energy	150	59	9
Environmental Protection Agency	57	13	0
General Services Administration	28	1	0
Health and Human Services	151	21	0
Housing and Urban Development	26	5	0
Interior	72	22	6
Justice	57	23	7
Labor	50	5	0
Merit Systems Protection Board	2	3	0
National Aeronautics and Space			
Administration	202	84	13
National Science Foundation	26	5	0
Nuclear Regulatory Commission	37	19	10
Office of Management and Budget	21	2	0
Office of Personnel Management	21	3	0
Securities and Exchange			
Commission	18	0	0
State	21	4	0
Transportation	81	17	0
Treasury	134	44	0
Veterans Administration	56	<u> 16</u>	_0
Subtotal	1,691	492	59
Other agencies	<u>176</u>	15	_0
Total	1,867	507	59

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>Data includes bonuses paid through September 30, 1982, and therefore differs from bonus data on appendices VIII, XI, and XIV.

#### DISTRIBUTION OF MULTIPLE CASH AWARDS TO SES MEMBERS

## FISCAL YEARS 1980 THROUGH 1982

	_			Merit	orious	rank			Dis	tingui	shed r	ank	Both	rank
	Bonuses				1		2		0		1	2	0	一丁
Agency/department	Incentive	1	2	0	1	0	1	2	1	0	1	0	0	0
Agriculture		0	0	8	1	4	0	0	0	3	0	0	n	n
Countraince:		1	0	12	1	2	Ŏ	ŏ	ŏ	ĭ	ŏ	ĭ	ň	ĭ
Defense		0	Ö	52	Ò	29	1	ŏ	ň	13	ň	Ġ	ĭ	Ġ
Education		0	1	1	1	0	Ó	ŏ	ĭ	0	ĭ	ň	'n	. 0
Energy		0	1	17	Ó	13	ŏ	Õ	;	2	i	1	ň	ň
<b>Environmental Protection</b>	Agency	2	Ó	2	Õ	0	· ň	ň	ō	5	'n	'n	ň	Ň
General Services Administ	tration	Ō	Ŏ	ō	ŏ	ŏ	ŏ	ň	ň	ñ	ŏ	ĭ	ň	Ň
Health and Human Services		Ŏ	Ŏ	11	Ă	ž	ň	1	ň	3	ň		Š	٠
Housing and Urban Develop	oment.	Ŏ	ŏ		ò	2	ň	'n	ň	î	ň	'n	2	'n
Interior		Ŏ	ŏ	ā	ŏ	5	ň	ñ	ň	i	ŏ	1	Ŏ	Ž
Justice		Õ	ŏ	3	ŏ	Ă	ĭ	ň	ň	'n	ň	,	ŏ	Ň
Labor		Ŏ	ŏ	3	ŏ	ō	ó	ň	ň	ĭ	ň	ń	ň	V
Merit Systems Protection	Board	ō	ň	ō	ň	1	ň	ň	ŏ	Ġ	ñ	~	Š	
National Aeronatics and S	space	•	•	•	•	•	v	v	v	U	v	U	U	U
Administration		1	0	20	2	16	0	0	0	1	0	2	2	
National Science Foundati		1	Ö	Ö	ō	Ö	ŏ	ŏ.	ŏ	ó	ň	ī	ń	ň
Nuclear Regulatory Commis	sion	0	0	1	0	. 4	Ŏ	ň	ň	ŏ	ŏ	i	ň	ň
Office of Management and	Budget	Ó	Ó	1	Ŏ	Ŏ	ŏ	ŏ	ŏ	ž	ŏ	ó	ň	ň
Office of Personnel Manage	rement.	0	0	2 .	0	0	Ô	Ô	ñ	ō	ň	ň	ň	ň
Securities and Exchange (	Commission	0	0	2	Ō	Ö	Ŏ	ŏ	ŏ	ĭ	ŏ	ŏ	ň	ň
State		0	0	4	0	1	S	0	Ō	1	ň	ñ	ň	ĭ
Transportation		0	0	14	Ö	2	Ĩ	Ŏ	ŏ	ġ	ŏ	ĭ	ŏ	Ġ
Treasury		1	0	11	4	4	1	0	2	1	1	Ó	Ď.	1
Veterans Administration		<u>3</u>	1	_1	_2	0	<u>o</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>ī</u>	_ <u>i</u>	<u> </u>	<u>ŏ</u>	<u>ŏ</u>	<u> </u>
Subtotal		9	3	171	15	90	4	1	6	36	3	17	5	15
Other agencies		_1	<u>o</u>	_3	_1	_0	<u>0</u>	<u>o</u>	1	_1	<u>o</u>	_0	<u>o</u>	_0
Total		10	3	174	16	90	4	1	7	37	3	17	5	15

Note: The table shows SES members who received rank awards and at least one other type of cash award. For example, at the Department of Agriculture, eight SES members received a meritorious rank and one bonus but no incentive award and one SES member received a meritorious rank, one bonus, and one incentive award.

#### NUMBER OF LESS THAN FULLY SUCCESSFUL PERFORMANCE RATINGS

#### FISCAL YEARS 1980 THROUGH 1982

	Number receiving successful perf	ormance ratings
Agency/department	Unsatisfactory	Minimally Satisfactory
Commerce	0	4
Defense	1	9
Energy	0	7
General Services Administration	1	2
Housing and Urban Development	0	1
Interior	0	1
Justice	0	2
Labor	1	4
Merit Systems Protection Board	0	3 2
National Aeronautics and Space Administration	0	2
Nuclear Regulatory Commission	0	9
Office of Management and Budget	0	1
Securities and Exchange Commission	0	. 1
Small Business Administration	0	5
Transportation	0	3
Treasury	0	5
Community Services Administration	0	2
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission	1	4
Federal Emergency Management Agency	0	2
Federal Trade Commission	0	3
National Transportation and Safety Board	<u>0</u>	_1
Total	4	71 <sup>a</sup>

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm a}{\rm Two}$  of the minimally satisfactory ratings were given to noncareer SES members and two were given to limited term appointees.

## COMPARISON OF EARLY RETIREMENTS TO TOTAL SES RETIREMENTS

	July 13, 1979 to September 30, 1979	Fiscal year 1980	Fiscal year 1981	Fiscal year 1982	October 1, 1982 to June 30, 1983	Total
Total SES retirements	128	. 767	333	259	122	1,609
Number of early retirements	25	37	56	. <b>69</b>	17	204
Percent of total retirements that were early	19.5	4.8	16.8	26.6	13.9	12.7

## COMPARISON OF PERFORMANCE RATINGS FOR SFS MEMBERS WHO RETIRED

## EARLY WITH THOSE WHO HAVE RECEIVED PERFORMANCE RATINGS

	Less than fully successful		Fully successful but not top		Top rated		Total	
Period	Number		Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Early retirees:a								
Fiscal year 1980	0	0.0	3	50.0	3	50.0	6	100.0
Fiscal year 1981	4	7.8	33	64.7	14	27.5	51	100.0
Fiscal year 1982 October 1, 1982	1	1.6	51	80.9	11	17.5	63	100.0
through June 30, 1983	1	6.7	_9	60.0	5	33.3	<u>15</u>	100.0
Total	6 <del></del>	4.4	96	71.1	33	24.5	135	100.0
All SES members receiving ratings:								
Fiscal year 1980	25	0.8	2,090	65.6	1,069	33.6	3,184	100.0
Fiscal year 1981	33	0.6	3,135	58.8	2,163	40.6	5,331	100.0
Fiscal year 1982	17	0.3	3,018	57.8	2,185	41.9	5,220	100.0

 $<sup>^{\</sup>mathrm{a}}\mathrm{Sixty}\text{-nine}$  of the early retirees did not receive a performance rating in SES prior to their retirement.

## COMPARISON OF SELECTED AGENCIES' SES SLOTS: FISCAL YEAR 1982 REQUESTS,

## CPM ANALYSTS' RECOMMENDATION, OPM DIRECTOR'S APPROVED ALLOCATION

	Agency/department	Slots authorized as of June 30, 1981	Agencies' slot requests	OPM analysts' slot recommendations to Director, OPM	Final slot allocations approved by Director, OPM
	ACTION	17	20	14	21
	Agriculture	395	458	388	406
	Civil Aeronautics Board	30	27	27	27
	Commerce	549	543	490	528
	Commission on Civil Rights	9	9	9	9
	Commodity Futures Trading Commission	21	21	18	18
22	Consumer Product Safety Commission Defense	15	15	13	13
	Office of Secretary of Defense	434	472	387	436
	Air Force	223	. 229	210	223
	Army	357	395	334	356
	Navy	448	448	420	448
	Education	113	98	88	88
	Energy	730	639	610	630
	Environmental Protection Agency	293	288	258	259
	Equal Employment Opportunity Commission	44	44	44	. <b>44</b>
	Farm Credit Administration	12	13	13	13
	Federal Communications Commission	40	45	37	42
	Pederal Emergency Management Agency	61	61	58	42 61
	Robertal Home Loan Bank Board	19	20	19	19
	Federal Labor Relations Authority	22	25	22	22
	Federal Maritime Commission	12	12	11	11
	Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service	16	16	16	16
	Federal Trade Commission	45	50	45	42
	General Services Administration	117	126	119	130

Agency/department	Slots authorized as of June 30, 1981	Agencies' slot	OPM analysts' slot recommendations to Director, OPM	Final slot allocations approved by Director, OPM	×
Health and Human Services	705	670			
Housing and Urban Development	139	670	539	650	
Interior	298	139	136	137	
International Trade Commission	6	316	282	298`	
Interstate Commerce Commission	42	8	6	7	
Justice	270	40	40	40	
Tabor	-· ·	270	240	270	
Merit Systems Protection Board/Office of	197	197	187	197	
Special Counsel				137	
National Aeronautics and Space Administration	23	27	24	26	
National Credit Union Administration		520	490	520	
National Endowment for the Arts	17	17	17	17	
National Endowment for the Humanities	10	10	8		
National Labor Relations Board	10	12	ğ	9	
National Science Foundation	- 65	` 65	65	9	
National Management of	131	123	121	60	
National Transportation Safety Board	12	12	121	125	
Nuclear Regulatory Commission	216	225	216	12	
Office of Management and Budget	101	102		220	
Office of Personnel Management	87	87	101	101	
Office of the Federal Inspector, Alaska Natur	al	07	85	85	
was itemsportation System	13	- 14			
Mailroad Retirement Board	11	11	11	11	
Securities and Exchange Commission	48		. 9	11	
Small Business Administration	53	53	, <u>48</u>	50	
State	107	55	53	53	
Transportation	421	128	99	107	⋗
Treasury		455	438	456	Ā
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency	575	593	560	575	Ë
U.S. Information Agency	24	24	22	24	ž
U.S. International Development Corporation	23	40	31	31	APPENDI
Agency/Agency for International Development				<b>.</b> .	×
Veterans Administration		66	55	60	~
	119	160	121	160	×

# COMPARISON OF SELECTED AGENCIES' SES SLOTS: FISCAL YEAR 1983 REQUESTS, U.M. ANALYSTS' RECOMMENDATION, OPM DIRECTOR'S APPROVED ALLOCATION

	Agency/department	Slots authorized as of June 30, 1981	Agencies' slot requests	OPM analysts' slot recommendations to Director, OPM	Pinal slot allocations approved by Director, OPM
	ACTION	17	20	• •	
	Agriculture	395	459	14	21
	Civil Aeronautics Board	30	26	388	405
	Commerce	549	26 543	26	_27
	Commission on Civil Rights	9		480	528
	Commodity Putures Trading Commission	21	9	9	9
Š	Consumer Product Safety Commission	15	21	18	18
-	Defense	13	15	13	13
	Office of Secretary of Defense	434			
	Air Force		475	387	430
	Army	223	229	200	225
	Navy	357	395	330	362
	Education	448	448	400	449
		113	98	88	88
	Energy	730	628	610	629
	Environmental Protection Agency	293	288	258	258
	Equal Employment Opportunity Commission	44	44	44	44
	Farm Credit Administration	12	13	13	13
	Federal Communications Commission	40	45	37	42
	Federal Emergency Management Agency	61	61	58	61
	Rederal Home Loan Bank Board	19	20	19	19
	Federal Labor Relations Authority	22	25	22	
	Federal Maritime Commission	12	12	11	22
	Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service	16	16	• •	11
	Federal Trade Commission	45	50	16 45	16
	General Services Administration	117	126	-	42
		117	126	119	123

APPENDIX XX

Agency/department	Slots authorized as of June 30, 1981	Agencies' slot requests	OPM analysts' slot recommendations to Director, OPM	Final slot allocations approved by Director, OPM
Health and Human Services	705	670	539	650
Housing and Urban Development	139	139	134	137
Interior	298	316	282	298
International Trade Commission	6	8	6	7
Interstate Commerce Commission	42	38	38	40
Justice	270	270	240	271
Lahor	197	197	187	197
Merit Systems Protection Board/Office of				
Special Counsel	23	27	24	26
National Aeronautics and Space Administration		520	490	520
National Credit Union Administration	17	17	17	17
National Endowment for the Arts	10	10	8	9
National Endowment for the Humanities	10	12	9	9
National Labor Relations Board	65	65	65	60
National Science Foundation	131	123	121	124
National Transportation Safety Board	12	12	12	12
Nuclear Regulatory Commission	216	225	216	220
Office of Management and Budget	101	102	101	101
Office of Personnel Management	87	87	85	85
Office of the Federal Inspector, Alaska Natu	ıral			
Gas Transportation System	13	15	12	11
Hailroad Retirement Board	11	9	9	10
Securities and Exchange Commission	48	53	48	50
Small Business Administration	53	55	53	53
State	107	128	<del>9</del> 9	107
Transportation	421	456	<b>42</b> 2	439
Treasury	575	593	560	572
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency	24	24	20	24
U.S. Information Agency	23	40	28	31
U.S. International Development Corporation				
Agency/Agency for International Developmen		66	55	60
Veterans Administration	119	160	.121	160

#### SES REASSIGNMENTS - JULY 13, 1979, TO MARCH 31, 1983

			reassignment		reassign	ments_
	Total	Wash., D.C.	Pield to	Within		
	number of	SMSAª		Wash., D.C.		Between
Agency/department	reassignments	to field	SMSAª	SMSA	states	states
Agriculture	183	13	21	138	5	6
Commerce	226	3	8	203	11	. 1
Defense	447	16	17	336	63	15
Office of the Secretary	(159)	(5)	(4)	(150)	(0)	(0)
Air Porce	(47)	(2)	(1)	(24)	(13)	(7)
Arcmy	(74)	(4)	(6)	(40)	(21)	(3)
Navy	(167)	(5)	(6)	(122)	(29)	(5)
Diocation	46	0	0	46	0	· O
Energy	406	14	10	341	36	5
Environmental Protection Agency	148	11	16	101	16	4
General Services Administration	86	12	3	64	6	1
Health and Human Services	215	9	9	151	38	8
Rousing and Orban Development	56	1	5	40	1	9
Interior	162	20	14	104	6	18
Justice	101	4	2	83	2	10
Tahor	81	9	9	57	0	6
Merit Systems Protection Board	4	0	.0	3	0	1
National Aeronautics and Space Administration	267	8	12	137	107	3
National Science Poundation	46	. 0	0	46	0	0
Nuclear Regulatory Commission	208	4	1	190	11	2
Office of Management and Budget	26	0	0	26	0	0
Office of Personnel Management	63	1	4	54	3	1
Securities and Exchange Commission	17	1	0	12	4	. 0
State	15	0	0	15	0	0
Transportation	225	25	10	148	26	16
Treasury	288	23	25	178	26	36
Veterans Administration	115	5	_4	47	12	47
Subtotal	3,431	179	170	2,520	373	189
Other agencies	294	_11	16	254	5	_8_
Total	3,725b	190	186	2,774	378	197

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>Standard Metropolitian Statistical Area which basically includes Washington, D.C. and surrounding areas in Maryland and Virginia.

b2,939 senior executives were involved in these reassignments.

APPENDIX XXII

APPENDIX XXII



## UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

LOLPAL I LHSONHEL AND COMPLISATION DIVISION

PC-4667

MAY 131983

The Honorable William D. Ford Chairman, Committee on Post Office and Civil Service House of Representatives

The Honorable Patricia Schroeder Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Civil Service Committee on Post Office and Civil Service House of Representatives

This letter provides information on the cost of geographic reassignments for Senior Executive Service (SES) employees, one of the points you asked us to address in your July 26, 1982, letter. On January 7, 1983, we provided you with information on the number of SES geographic relocations reported by OPM and agreed to furnish data on the cost as soon as we could collect the necessary information from Federal departments and agencies.

Between July 13, 1979—when SES went into effect—and February 1, 1983—when current information became available—536 SES employees from 29 departments and agencies were geographically relocated. 1/ The total cost to the Government of 472 of those moves (88 percent of the total number) for which data was available was \$3.7 million, or about \$8,000 per move.

Additionally, approximately 43 percent of the relocated members for which data was available were not reimbursed the entire amount they claimed as relocation expenses because regulations disallowed various items. Individuals that claimed nonreimbursable expenses were disallowed an average of about \$1,200 each.

<sup>1/</sup>This figure reflects interstate moves only.

PC-4667

Some senior executives may not have reported all relocation costs because they knew in advance certain items would not be reimbursed. Some of the items not reported, however, such as the expense of financing a new home at a higher interest rate, constituted a very real cost to the relocated members.

The enclosed chart shows available information on reimbursements paid by the 29 Federal departments and agencies to geographically relocated SES members between July 13, 1979, and February 1, 1983. It also shows relocation expenses claimed by SES members but disallowed by departments and agencies.

We stated in our January 7, 1983, letter to you that we are currently examining major aspects of the SES program in preparation for oversight hearings later this year. The subject of SES reassignments is a part of our overall review, and we will advise you of our findings in this area.

We trust that the cost information provided in this letter and the information on the number of relocated SES members proviced in our January 7, 1983, letter is responsive to your request.

Clifford I. Gould

Director

Enclosure

#### SES GEOGRAPHIC RELOCATION COSTS (note a) (Reimbursed and nonreimbursed claims between July 13, 1979, and Pebruary 1, 1983)

Department/agency	Total number of geographic relocations on which cost data was available	Total reimbursed relocation expenses	Average reim- bursement per SES relocation	Number of SES reloca- tion claims which were not fully reimbursed	reimbursed	reimbursed
Agriculture	27	\$206,014	\$7,630	9	\$4,087	\$454
Cumerce	10	60,975	6,098	5	1,664	333
Commodity Futures Trading Commission	_1	1,552	1,552	0	0	0
Defense	31	219,279	7,074	17	34,732	2,043
Energy	14	132,375	9,455	12	8,808	734
Environmental Protection Agency Final Employment Opportunity	22	129,274	5,876	7	4,598	657
Commission	8	7,716	965	2	1.718	859
Federal Brergency Management Agency	1 1	2,104	2,104	l ō	0	0
Federal Labor Relations Authority Federal Mediation and Conciliation	1	2,398	2,398	i	248	248
Sexvice	1 2	25,513	12,757	0	0	1 0
Federal Trade Commission	1 1	921	921	1	115	115
General Services Administration	24	83,450	3,477	11	4,405	400
Health and Human Services	10	77,189	7,719	4	7,402	1,851
Housing and Urban Development	12	59,994	5,000	6	5,066	844
Interior	40	377,328	9,433	19	15,296	805
Interstate Commerce Commission	į i	14,791	14,791	0	0	0
Justice	16	126,995	7,937	6	2,433	406
Labor	16	119,075	7,442	16	28,384	1,774
Merit Systems Protection Board National Aeronautics and Space	1	4,205	4,205	0	0	0
Administration	14	151,277	10,806	10	46,424	4,642
National Credit Union Administration	. 6	64,787	10,798	0	0	0
National Labor Relations Board	5	71,531	14,306	0	) 0	U
Niclear Regulatory Commission	5	27,467	5,493	4	4,321	1,080
Office of Personnel Management	4	20,836	5,209	1	4,702	4,702
Securities and Exchange Commission	2	6,655	3,328	1	818	818
Small Business Administration	5	55,953	11,191	5	10,197	2,039
Transportation	47	372,428	7,924	17	18,721	1,101
Treasury	92	949,752	10,323	29	26,772	923
Veterans Administration	_54	\$ 362,632	\$ <u>6,715</u>	_20	\$ 7,987	\$_399
	472	\$3,734,466	\$7,912	203	\$238,898	\$1,177

a/Total geographic relocation cost data was available on 88 percent of the 536 relocations occurring during this period. Information on the other 12 percent had either not been received/processed by the agencies or was unavailable.

#### SES INTERAGENCY TRANSPERS - JULY 13, 1979, TO MARCH 31, 1983

		Number of transfers by type of reassignments				
	Total	Wash., D.C.	Pield to	Within		
	number of	SMSA <sup>a</sup>		Wash., D.C.	Within	Between
Agency/department	transfers	to field	<u>SMSA</u> a	SMSAª	states	states
				_		•
Agriculture	11	0	1	9 34	0	ŭ
Commerce	37	1	2			ų.
Defense	77	.5	2	66	0	40.
Office of the Secretary	(25)	(0)	(0)	(25)	(0)	(0)
Air Force	(15)	(2)	(0)	(12)	(0)	(1)
Акту	(18)	(3)	(0).	(13)	(0)	(2)
Navy	(19)	(0)	(2)	(16)	(0)	(1)
Education	11	. 0	1	10	0	0
Energy	38	2	2	33	0	1
Environmental Protection Agency	7	1	0	6	0	Ō
General Services Administration	23	0	1	15	7	0
Health and Human Services	18	3	0	13	0	2
Housing and Urban Development	. 5	0	0	5	0	0
Interior	12	0	0	12	0	0
Justice	9	0	1	8	0	0
Labor	7	0	1	6	0	0
National Aeronautics and Space Administration	11	0	0	11	0	0
National Science Poundation	4	0	0	4	0	0
Nuclear Regulatory Commission	9	0	2	7	0	0
Office of Management and Budget	11	0	0	11	' 0	0
Office of Personnel Management	11	0	0	11	0	0
Securities and Exchange Commission	1	1	0	0	0	0
State	7	Ó	Ô	7	0	0
Transportation	10	Ō	Ö	10	0	0
Treasury	12	Ŏ	Ô	12	0	0
Veterans Administration	15	Ō	0	15	0	0
Verterals Administration			_			_
Subtotal	346	13	13	305	8	7
Other agencies	_56	_1	_0	55	_0	_0
Total	402 <sup>b</sup>	14	13	360	8	7_

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>Skandard Metropolitian Statistical Area which basically includes Washington, D.C. and surrounding areas in Maryland and Virginia.

b383 senior executives were involved in these interagency transfers.




APPENDIX XXIV

## CONVERSIONS FROM NONCAREER TO CAREER APPOINTMENTS

## JULY 13, 1979, TO SEPTEMBER 30, 1983

Agency/department	Dates of conversions	Appointment when converted to career
Action	April 28, 1980 October 27, 1981	Foreign Service Reserve Consultant
Agriculture	December 28, 1979 August 13, 1980 February 22, 1983	SES noncareer SES noncareer SES noncareer
Defense	October 28, 1980 November 19, 1981 May 25, 1982 June 26, 1983	Schedule C Schedule B Schedule C SES noncareer
Energy	September 3, 1980	Presidential
Environmental Protection Agency	March 6, 1980	SES noncareer
Equal Employment Oppor- tunity Commission	January 3, 1980 February 14, 1980	SES noncareer SES noncareer
Federal Communications Commission	May 19, 1980 May 19, 1980	SES limited emergency SES limited emergency
Federal Labor Relations Authority	October 28, 1980	SES noncareer
General Services Administration	April 24, 1980	SES noncareer
Health and Human Services	August 8, 1979 November 16, 1982	Foreign Service Reserve Schedule C
Housing and Urban Development	May 17, 1983	SES noncareer
Interior	August 6, 1979 November 13, 1979 July 19, 1983	SES noncareer SES noncareer SES noncareer





Agency/department	Dates of conversions	Appointment when converted to career
International Communica- tion commission	January 11, 1980 February 1, 1980 March 9, 1982	Schedule C Consultant SES noncareer
Justice	December 31, 1979 July 19, 1983	SES noncareer SES noncareer
Labor	August 1, 1979 November 17, 1981	Schedule C Noncareer GS-17 executive
National Aeronautics and Space Administration	June 24, 1980 July 8, 1980 December 28, 1982	SES noncareer SES noncareer SES noncareer
National Labor Relations Board	October 6, 1981 March 16, 1982	Competitive service SES noncareer
National Science Foundation	April 22, 1980	SES noncareer
Navy	January 5, 1982 August 10, 1982	Schedule A SES limited term
Office of Management and Budget	January 11, 1982	Noncareer GS-16 executive
Office of Personnel Management	January 7, 1981	SES noncareer
Small Business Administration	July 13, 1982 April 26, 1983	Schedule C Competitive service
State	August 21, 1980 July 19, 1983	SES noncareer SES noncareer
Transportation	August 27, 1979 March 13, 1980 November 4, 1980 August 26, 1981	Noncareer GS-16 executive SES noncareer Schedule C Consultant
Treasury	November 12, 1980 July 19, 1983	SES noncareer SES noncareer

Total noncareer to career conversions = 50

## COMPLIANCE WITH THE STATUTORY LIMITS ON NONCAREER,

### LIMITED TERM, AND LIMITED EMERGENCY APPOINTMENTS

	SES appointments				
	July 13, 1979	Sept. 30, 1980	Sept. 30, 1981	Sept. 30, 1982	March 31, 1983
Total SES positions allocated	8,389	8,592	8,593	8,227	8,211
Noncareer positions					
Total permitteda	838	859	859	822	821
Number allocated	826	829	822	733	769
Number filled by noncareer Percent of total allocated SES positions filled by	489	582	467	648	670
noncareer	5.8	6.8	5.4	7.9	8.2
Total SES positions established Percent filled by noncareer	7,677 6.4	8,210 7.1	8,136 5.7	7,932 8.2	7,861 8.5
Total positions filled Percent filled by noncareer	6,948 7.0	7,038 8.3	6,481 7.2	6,762 9.6	6,873 9.7
Limited term and limited emergency appointments					
Total number permitted <sup>b</sup>	419	429	429	411	410
Number allocated	N/A	100	106	97	106
Number filled Percent of total allocated SES positions filled by limited term and limited	29	77	42	47	60
emergency	0.3	0.9	0.5	0.6	0.7

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>Up to 10 percent of the total allocated positions may be filled by noncareer appointments.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>b</sup>Up to 5 percent of total allocated positions may be filled by limited term and limited emergency appointments.

APPENDIX XXVI

# CHANGES BETWEEN CAREER RESERVED<sup>a</sup> AND GENERAL<sup>b</sup> SES POSITIONS

## JULY 13, 1979, TO JUNE 30, 1983

Agency/department	Career reserved to general	General to career reserved
Commerce	0	3
Commodity Futures Trading		
Commission	0	3
Consumer Product Safety	_	_
Commission	0	2
Defense	4	196 <sup>C</sup>
Education	2	10
Environmental Proection	_	_
Agency	0	7
Farm Credit Administration	0	2
Federal Mediation and		
Conciliation Service	0	1
General Services		•
Administration	<b>4</b> 0	0 5
Health and Human Services	_	16
Interior	0	10
International	0	5
Communication Agency International Development	U	5
_	0	7
Cooperation Agency Justice	5	í
Labor National Science Foundation	0 3	1
Office of Personnel	•	•
	0	1
Management Small Business	. •	•
Administration	0	2
Transportation	1	3
Treasury	2	Ö
reasury	<u> </u>	
Total	21	266
		<del></del>

aCareer reserved positions are those which can only be filled by career employees to ensure impartiality or the public confidence in government.

bGeneral positions are those which can be filled by career, non-career, or limited term and emergency appointees.

CThe large number of conversions was due to initial misclassifications by the Department of the Navy of 192 positions.

## NUMBER OF CAREER RESERVED AND GENERAL POSITIONS

	July 13, 1979 Number Percent	Sept. 30, 1980 Number Percent	Sept 30, 1981 Number Percent	Sept. 30, 1982 Number Percent	March 31, 1983 Number percent
Allocated Career reserved General	3,608 43.0 4,781 57.0	3,672 42.7 4,920 57.3	3,649 42.5 4,944 57.5	3,671 44.6 4,556 55.4	3,671 44.7 4,540 55.3
Total Established	8,389 100.0	8,592 100.0	8,593 100.0	8,227 100.0	8,211 `100.0
Career reserved General	3,377 44.0 4,300 56.0	3,595 43.8 4,615 56.2	3,630 44.6 4,506 55.4	3,779 47.6 4,153 52.4	3,798 48.3 4,063 51.7
Total ω	7,677 100.0	8,210 100.0	8,136 100.0	7,932 100.0	7,861 100.0
Filled Career reserved General	3,114 44.8 3,834 55.2	3,064 43.5 3,974 56.5	2,980 46.0 3,501 54.0	3,245 48.0 3,517 52.0	3,339 48.6 3,534 51.4
Total	6,948 100.0	7,038 100.0	6,481 100.0	6,762 100.0	6,873 100.0
Vacant Career reservéd General	263 36.0 466 64.0	531 45.3 641 54.7	650 39.3 1,005 60.7	534 45.6 636 54.4	459 46.5 529 53.5
Total	729 100.0	1,172 100.0	1,655 100.0	1,170 100.0	988 100.0

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>Career reserved positions are those which can only be filled by career employees to ensure impartiality or the public confidence in government.

 $<sup>^{\</sup>mathrm{b}}$ General positions are those which can be filled by career, noncareer, or limited term and emergency appointees.

## LIST OF SABBATICALS AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1983

Agency/department	Dates	Position prior to sabbatical	Sabbatical course of study or work	Estimated years <sup>a</sup> until eligible for retirement
Air Force	February 1, 1983- August 16, 1983	Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics Operations	Royal Australian Air Force, study maintenance and logistics	6
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency	August 1, 1981- July 1, 1982	Deputy Assistant Director, Multilateral Affairs Bureau	Visiting scholar, National Security and Soviet Affairs, University of North Carolina	9
	September 1, 1981- August 1, 1982	Chief, Technology Transfer Group	Visiting scholar, Georgetown University, study of Third World domestic arms production	9
Army	September 1, 1981- August 1, 1982	Director, Division of Biochemistry, Walter Reed	Visiting Professor of Cellular Biology, Salk Institute, UCSD	9
Defense Mapping Agency	January 10, 1983- December 9, 1983	Comptroller	Doctoral level program in management, USC	9
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission	July 30, 1982- June 30, 1983	Deputy General Counsel	Information unavailable	13
Interior	October 1, 1983- July 1, 1984	Assistant Director for Economics	Research on marketing and eco- nomics of water policy-UC Davis	5
National Aeronautics and Space Administration	May 1, 1983- April 1, 1984	Chief, Biomedical Research	Cardiovascular research, Stanford	6
	September 1, 1983- August 1, 1984	Chief Scientist, Geodynamics Branch	University, School of Medicine Center for Seismic Studies-DARPA <sup>b</sup> geophysical research	, 10

36

Agency/department	Dates	Position prior to sabbatical	Sabbatical course of study or work	Estimated years <sup>8</sup> until eligible for retirement
Nuclear Regulatory Commission	August 1, 1983- June 30, 1984	Deputy Director, Division of Quality Assurance	Visiting fellow, Battelle Corps., studies of organizational development	13
Transportation	May 1, 1982- April 1, 1983	Acting Associate Administrator for Research and Development	Postdoctoral research on motor vehicle safety, Oxford University, England	7

 $<sup>{}^{\!</sup> a}\! {}_{\! B}\!$  assed on age and years of service at beginning of sabbatical.

 $<sup>^{\</sup>mathrm{b}}\!\mathrm{Defense}$  Advanced Research Projects Agency, Arlington, Virginia.